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Abstract
Mega-events occupy important roles within global consumer societies, and so, this article
aims to advance the sociological understanding of mega-events by using UEFA Euro 2020 as
a case. Traditionally, sport mega-events have been staged in one or two countries. However,
for the first time ever, 12 European countries shared the hosting rights for Euro 2020, which
was postponed for a year following COVID-19. In global sports, this temporary shift was
highly remarkable and the 12-country format’s implications raised a host of sociological
questions. Drawing upon qualitative interviews, documentary analysis and media sources, this
article examines this mega-event’s distinctive format and its broader implications. The article
explores the socio-political conditions under which Euro 2020’s format became a reality and
examines stakeholder outlooks on this event format. It is argued that the event’s format was
considered to limit negative ‘legacies’ for host cities, yet the format was perceived to generate
logistical and financial difficulties for potential mega-event consumers. In an epoch charac-
terized by growing opposition tomega-event hosting, such findings are particularly important.
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Introduction
This article examines the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) 2020 Eu-
ropean Championship in men’s football (‘Euro 2020’). Essentially, in global consumer
societies, mega-event ‘spectacles’ represent important indicators of ‘the symbolic impact
of consumption’ (Miles, 2010: 95) and the wider uniqueness of Euro 2020 as a mega-
event is demonstrated by its hosting format and recent developments: for the first time in
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history, it would be staged in 12 co-hosting countries spread around Europe.1Moreover, due
to the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the tournament was postponed
and, as Parnell et al., 2020: 3) write, the event’s geographies and ‘networked strength’
proved to be its ‘Achilles heel’. Instead of taking place in June and July 2020, UEFA
confirmed that it would be rescheduled to June and July 2021. However, at the time of
writing, it is expected that fans – though in restricted numbers – will be able to have
a presence within the event’s consumption circuits. Furthermore, the event has retained its
name, Euro 2020, and its multi-host format (UEFA, 2020).2
Upon proceeding, this article utilizes a sport mega-event (SME) as an entry to un-
derstand wider trends and processes in the modern world’s consumer societies. For Smart
(2018), mega-events constitute ‘commercial consumer festivals’, and further, it is well-
established that ‘sport is playing a crucial role in the making of transnational society’
(Giulianotti and Brownell, 2012: 214), whereas SMEs constitute key sites for the un-
derstanding of social issues and broader socio-political trends and dynamics (Gilchrist
et al., 2015). SMEs can also yield insights into urban processes of marginalization and
inequality (Kennelly and Watt, 2013). Indeed, Giulianotti et al. (2015: 112) highlight the
importance of investigating perceptions of SMEs hosted in different settings and in the
context of what they dub transnational consumer projects that, fundamentally, are enacted
by the ‘festival capitalism’ that ‘envelopes mega-events’.
Thus, in a novel and under-explored SME context, this article examines the back-
ground of this untested mega-event format and its impacts on the main event consumers,
the fans, through an investigation of stakeholder perceptions of this unorthodox hosting
style which, principally, paved the way for a European-wide ‘consumer festival’. The
unfolding argument is that the format, emerging out of both internal and external de-
velopments, was perceived to limit so-called ‘white elephants’ (Horne, 2007) and
negative legacies for host cities, whilst simultaneously increasing the financial costs for
the event’s consumers. Pre-event (and pre-COVID-19), it was expected that 2.5 million
visitors from around the world would travel to Euro 2020 cities (Independent, 2020).
Although this number is likely to be lower given the COVID-19 restrictions, Euro 2020
will still provide multiple sites that allow for distinct consumer experiences, through
attendance in stadiums, fan zones and the new ‘UEFA Festival’. Indeed, the European
Championships, popularly referred to as ‘the Euros’, are among those international events
that can claim to be the world’s third largest SMEs behind the Olympics and the FIFA
Men’s World Cup. Just like these gigantic events, the Euros are tightly knitted to highly
politicized bidding processes, intense mega-event securitizations (Klauser, 2013) and host
nations’ legacy promises. And crucially, the Euros contribute towards the creation of both
consumer identities and spaces (Horne, 2010) for fans and event consumers that are
attending matches, fan zones and, more broadly, consuming the event’s images and goods.
Traditionally, however, SMEs have been staged in one country. Yet, since the turn of
the millennium, it can be observed that two geographically close countries have co-hosted
mega-events (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004). Euro 2000 was co-hosted by Belgium and
the Netherlands, and as Horne and Manzenreiter (2006) highlight, the 2002 Men’s World
Cup in South Korea and Japan was the first World Cup to be shared by two nations.
Consequently, UEFA’s decision to award 12 countries the Euro 2020 hosting rights
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symbolized a highly significant moment in global sport, but also for the responsive
sociology of SMEs. Indeed, it really epitomized the claim that mega-events ‘always have
the capacity to surprise us and show us something new about our social world’ (Roche,
2017: 4). Whereas Euro 2020’s hosting format was untested in the world-leading mega-
events, it is noticeable that the tournament format was decided upon in a time where SME
staging has been criticized for their associated financial costs, organizational complexities
and the overpromising of mega-event benefits (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Müller,
2015a). Even to the extent where the term the ‘mega-event syndrome’ was coined:
explaining why mega-event planning and implementation rarely materialize as envisaged
(Müller, 2015a). Concurrently, concerning the format shift, others have noted that it may
be interpreted as a demonstration of cultural togetherness and fluidity within the Eu-
rozone, and a celebration of the tournament’s 60th anniversary (Parnell et al., 2020). In
other words, the precise reasons for the significant shift of format remain somewhat
contested, making it imperative to investigate exactly why the departure from the tra-
ditional hosting format occurred and, moreover, the wide-reaching consumption and
consumer-related and organizational implications of this, as perceived by a set of
stakeholders.
With this significant shift acting as the backdrop for this paper’s investigation, this
article thereby aims to make both timely and original contributions to the sociology of
mega-events, their consumption and the broader debates related to sports’ commer-
cialization projects, by empirically extending the knowledge-base on Euro 2020. Cur-
rently, Euro 2020 has been dedicated limited empirical research (for a research agenda,
see Ludvigsen, 2019) and this study contributes with original insights on its unorthodox
format, whilst also making sociological sense of its implications for travelling fans and
those seeking to consume this mega-event. Though, such insights may also have rele-
vance beyond academic spheres. Especially if Euro 2020 symbolizes a turning point in the
universe of mega-events, indicating that geographically dispersed events and/or cultural
festivals are becoming increasingly attractive and resorted to by cities, planners and event
owners. If that is the case, then this will likely change the socio-spatial and cultural
dynamics of SME and football-related consumption which constitute important aspects of
the present-day consumer culture. And so, the research questions this article will address
are:
1. Under which conditions did Euro 2020’s European-wide format become a reality?
2. In what ways did stakeholders perceive Euro 2020’s new format?
Literature review: Revisiting mega-events in global
consumer societies
Defining ‘mega-events’ is no easy task given the term’s ambiguous nature (Miles, 2010;
Müller, 2015b). As used here, mega-events are ‘large-scale cultural (including com-
mercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and
international significance’ (Roche 2000: 1). Roche (2000) instigated the sociological
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understanding of mega-events as multidimensional, liminal and landmark happenings in
modern societies. Focusing primarily on the Olympic Games and World Fairs, Roche
observed how host cities employed mega-events and the associated worldwide media
coverage to demonstrate the region’s/city’s cultural qualities while pushing for economic
impact through the tourist industry, investment and consumption.
Roche also highlighted how mega-events were staged to convey progressive signals to
audiences worldwide. Essentially, SMEs can be approached as operating on social, eco-
nomic, cultural and political levels. They are commonly driven by powerful corporate
interests (Giulianotti and Numerato, 2018), aim to draw in new consumers (Giulianotti
et al., 2015) and are employed in countries or regions as vehicles for fast-tracked urban
policies and regeneration aims. Further, SMEs are used as tools for ‘soft power’ (Brannagan
and Giulianotti, 2015) and for generating positive post-event ‘legacies’ (Gilchrist et al.,
2015; Horne, 2009; Preuss, 2007). As succinctly asHorne (2010: 863) puts it: ‘Mega-events
are short-life events with long-life pre- and post-event social dimensions, not least because
of their scale, their occupation and maintenance of a time cycle and their impacts’.
To account for such developments, social research examining SMEs has grown
substantially over the previous two decades. Frequently, studies have been tied up to aims
around events’ actual ability to provide ‘positive’ legacies, regeneration programmes or
impacts on local communities or residents (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Preuss, 2007).
Others examine public opposition and protests against SME housing (Giulianotti et al.,
2015) and the intensified commercialization of SMEs (Smart, 2018). Because the majority
of existing literature focuses on the Olympic Games or the FIFA Men’s World Cup,
substantially less attention has been dedicated to the Euros. The Euros represent the main
continental football competition for European men’s national teams. Only teams geo-
graphically located in Europe, with the exception of Israel, can qualify (Klauser, 2013).
The event’s commercial rights are owned by UEFA and the tournament itself – staged
every 4 years – has been hosted in various European countries.
This article cannot provide a full account of the Euros’ history (for this, see Mittag and
Legrand, 2010). Yet, some of this mega-event’s key developments must be mapped out to
understand the Euros’ size globally and the turn towards 12 host countries before the 2020
edition. The competition was founded in 1958 and staged for the first time in France in
1960 (ibid.). It then involved four competing teams. The following Championships were
hosted by Belgium (1972), Italy (1968), Spain (1964), Yugoslavia (1976) and Italy
(1980). A sign of expansion was evident from 1980 and onwards when the number of
involved national teams increased from four to eight. This number was then doubled (to
16) in tournaments between 1996 and 2012. Meanwhile, the European Championships
became popularly known as the ‘Euros’ following Euro ‘96 in England (Horne, 2010).
The 2000s saw a new trend emerging in the housing of the tournament. Whereas the
Euros, to this point, had been hosted by one single host, Belgium and the Netherlands co-
hosted Euro 2000. Whilst the single-host format was returned to for Euro 2004 (Portugal),
two hosts co-hosted Euro 2008 (Austria/Switzerland) and 2012 (Ukraine/Poland). Fol-
lowing this, the popularity and expansion of the Euros advanced further. Euro 2016
(France) was the first time the tournament had 24 qualified national teams, which is also
the current model (Ludvigsen, 2019).
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Such consistent expansion, however, should also be critically approached. Undeniably,
the Euros have been (in-)directly influenced by wider processes in global sports, including
globalization and commodification (Giulianotti, 2002). Here, the latter refers to where ‘an object
or social practice acquires an exchange value or market-centered meaning’ (ibid.: 26). Im-
portantly, the commodified Euros now represent a media spectacle that is broadcast to and
consumed by global audiences. For example, Euro 2016 generated an average of aroundUS$42
million per game in broadcastingmoney (Forbes, 2016). The expansion of the tournament must
thus be seen in relation to increased global interest, broadcasting and sponsorship.
Naturally, the event is not only consumed virtually nor metaphysically. Like other
SMEs, the European Championships are popular tourist destinations. Here, mega-event
consumers typically attend stadiums and fan zones and travel between host cities. Re-
cently, (UEFA, 2016a: 3) announced that 2.5 million spectators had physically attended
stadiums at France’s Euro 2016. The Paris fan zone alone, reportedly, attracted more than
one million fans (Ludvigsen, 2021). Huge influxes of fans were also anticipated before
2020, with 2.5 million people expected to visit Euro 2020 (Independent, 2020) before
COVID-19. Therefore, it is necessary to critically approach the Euros as a truly global
occasion which provides distinctive spaces for consumption (cf. Horne, 2010; Miles,
2010; Smart, 2018; O’Brien, 2021) for its fans and tourists, representing the event
consumers. And more broadly, the event also reflects the coalescence of contemporary
processes and trends in modern societies, including securitization, globalization, com-
modification and mediatization (see Numerato and Giulianotti, 2018).
Given the Euros’ long traditions, incontestable size and position in European (and
indeed global) societies, some researchers have examined the tournament. That includes
studies on national identities (Giulianotti, 1995; Maguire and Poulton, 1999), ‘cosmo-
politanism’ (Millward, 2010), policing (Stott, 2003) and security (Klauser, 2013;
Ludvigsen, 2021). Notwithstanding, the Euros’ recent expansion and developments have
been assigned less attention (for an exception, see Horne, 2010). That is paradoxical.
Ultimately, this SME’s expansion and the hosting style of Euro 2020, in various ways,
impact all the aforementioned themes as well as the ritualistic and symbolic values
attached to the tournament.
As underpinned by existing literature, the broader study of European football’s
governance is highly significant and sociologically important. King (2003) displays how
football represents a public ritual in European cultures. The structures of European
football are politicized and embedded into ideas of what Europe is or means and European
identities (King, 2003, 2004). However, in such context, for Geertz (1973), the social
reality is comprised of cultural ‘webs of meaning’ that attach meanings to the everyday
practices. Whereas Geertz notes that culture to an extent is shared, individual experiences
of human action and social interaction will simultaneously impact, for example, one’s
self-understanding of what European identity is, its affective and ascribed meanings and
how the culture-specific consumption of a ritualistic European mega-event would impact
these processes. Hence, the consumption of the Euro 2020 spectacle may ‘provide
a perspicuous view of Europe’s future’ (King, 2010: 890) across its countries and
construct narratives that individuals spin about themselves. Yet, against this backdrop –
and the continuous development of the Euros, moulded by wider processes in global
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sports, surprisingly limited research focuses on the perspectives or outlooks on the Euros.
Limited empirical research has been conducted on Euro 2020 which, as argued, sym-
bolized a highly unique event not just in terms of European football, but in the realm of
global sports and the consumption of football. Thus, attempting to fill this research gap
and answer the above research questions, this article first investigates why Euro 2020 was
assigned to 12 countries and situates this within wider SME-related trends. Then, the
article proceeds to voice stakeholder perceptions of the format change and its inter-linked
implications organizationally and vis-à-vis football’s consumption.
Methodology
This article is designed as a qualitative case study and draws from a larger study that
examined security, organization and pre-planning in Euro 2020’s context, as articulated
from stakeholder perspectives and documentary form (see Ludvigsen, 2021). However, as
unique to Euro 2020, the format would continually reappear as a dominant theme from the
analysis, which informs this article. The study employs three methods. First, it draws upon
a documentary analysis of publicly available policy documents from key stakeholder
organizations. Similar studies commonly use documents like bid books, evaluations and
handbooks in their analyses (Byun et al., 2020; Klauser, 2013). The documents were
purposively sampled and enabled a systematic reading of the relevant organizations’
formal and public discourses and statements. In total, the nine documents that collectively
composed 754 pages of text included, for instance, theUEFA EURO 2020 Bid Evaluation
Report (2014), a handbook consisting lessons from Euro 2004 in Portugal (UEFA, 2005)
and UEFA EURO 2020 Tournament Requirements (n.d.). Ultimately, such documents
remain of high relevance given their centrality in mega-event selection processes (Beissel
and Kohe, 2020). As publicly available on sporting bodies’ official channels, UEFA
(n.d.), for example, sets out the requirements that the host countries must adhere to. Yet, it
also provides a context of the Euros and cover the bid requirements, bid and support
process. Thus, UEFA (n.d.) contains sectors on, inter alia, Euro 2020’s political, eco-
nomic and legal contexts and event promotion and offered a glimpse into the event’s
socio-political and organizational parameters. This was also supplemented with relevant
international media articles and public statements.
Second, in-depth semi-structured interviews with nine diverse stakeholders of Euro
2020’s organization and/or event organization more generally were conducted before
Euro 2020. Interviewees were purposively sampled and included six individuals involved
in national or European-wide fan networks recognized by UEFA and, at different ca-
pacities, active in Euro 2020’s planning; one supporter liaison officer, one crowd safety
professional and one individual from the national media covering international mega-
events. After receiving ethical approval, qualitative semi-structured interviews were
conducted between January 2019 and February 2020.3 Importantly, interviews were
conducted before COVID-19 made Euro 2020’s postponement inevitable. Naturally, this
invites future research to investigate if COVID-19 may have altered perceptions of the
format and with other stakeholder groups (i.e. sponsors and politicians) to include their
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perspectives. All the interviewees were promised anonymity, signed consent forms and
have, if cited, been anonymized through pseudonyms.
In order to analyse the data, the interviews were – following manual transcription –
analysed by the use of an initial open coding technique which assisted the identification of
preliminary categories. As explained in more depth in Ludvigsen, 2021), this was fol-
lowed by axial and selective coding techniques determining the forthcoming discussed
themes. Finally, the third data source this article employs is secondary sources, including
existing academic sources and media sources (sampled through Google News) in order to
mitigate some of the challenges apparent in pre-event research and to explore Euro 2020’s
bidding stage.
Closer to the fans? Unpacking Euro 2020
When Euro 2012 took place in Ukraine and Poland, it had already been decided that Euro
2016 would be hosted in France. Throughout Euro 2012, however, questions started to
emerge over which country (or, indeed, countries) that would house Euro 2020. On the
day before the Euro 2012 final between Spain and Italy, then-UEFA president, Michel
Platini, revealed that his idea for Euro 2020 could involve a potential abandonment of the
traditional hosting format and even the more recent two-host format. Platini commented
that: ‘the Euros in 2020 could be held all over Europe’, but that ‘it could be either one
country and 12 stadium or one stadium in 12 or 13 cities’ (quoted in BBC, 2012a).
The potential financial advantages of such multi-host format – to be returned to in the
next section – were also touched upon by Platini, stating that: ‘It’s an idea I feel really
passionate about, it will be a lot easier from a financial perspective’ (ibid.). In December
2012, it was then confirmed by UEFA that there would be a temporary departure from the
traditional formats. Although the exact number of host countries was not confirmed, it was
stated that ‘Euro 2020 will be staged across the continent, in various major cities, fol-
lowing a decision taken today’ (BBC, 2012b). In an official statement, it was also
commented that Euro 2020 would provide a great opportunity for new hosts. The then-
UEFAGeneral Secretary, Gianni Infantino, also quoted the tournament’s 60th anniversary
as one of the reasons:
2020 is the 60th anniversary of the European Football Championship. Obviously the fact that
the EURO [final round] will feature 24 teams instead of 16 puts an additional burden on
countries to host such an event. It becomes much more difficult for many countries – the
requirements are becoming bigger and bigger […] This summer we saw a fantastic EURO in
Poland and Ukraine, but the governments and the two countries had to do quite a lot in terms
of infrastructure, airports and stadiums. An opportunity like this, to give many cities and
many countries the possibility to host even just one part of a EURO, is certainly an excellent
thing, especially in times when you have an economic situation where you cannot expect
countries to invest in facilities in the way that such an event requires (UEFA, 2012).
Consistent with the conception of mega-events as festivals (Smart, 2018), it was also
commented that ‘instead of having a party in one country, we will have a party all over
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Europe in the summer of 2020’ (UEFA, 2012). As such, it was clear in late 2012 that Euro
2020 would take up a highly unusual shape for the first time in the Euros’ history.
Essentially, it can also be seen that the additional challenge of 24 competing teams and
that inclusion of ‘new’ hosts and the inclusion of hosts that, under other circumstances,
would not bid for hosting rights were emphasized by the statement.
In April 2014, UEFA confirmed that they had received 19 bids for the hosting rights for
Euro 2020. In this statement, it became clear that ‘The UEFA EURO 2020 final tour-
nament will be staged in 12 cities across Europe, following a decision taken by the UEFA
Executive Committee in January 2013’ (UEFA, 2014a). The bid evaluation also con-
firmed that:
A total of 19 associations – Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, England,
Macedonia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Republic of Ireland, Romania,
Russia, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Wales – submitted bid dossiers to UEFA on 25 April 2014
(UEFA, 2014b: 3).
In a statement, Platini could declare that:
The 60th year anniversary edition of the tournament will be an historic one, with matches
played in many European countries […] By spreading the EURO across our continent, we
will allow more fans from more nations to share in the excitement of hosting such a magical
event (UEFA, 2014a)
Again, one may see the emphasis on inclusion and the highlighted benefits of the format.
On the 19 September 2014, 13 host cities were confirmed by the UEFA Executive
Committee. The bid evaluation report noted that ‘the 60th anniversary of the UEFA
European Football Championship will be the biggest celebration of European football
ever’ (UEFA, 2014b: 3).
Meanwhile, the UEFA President, Aleksander Čeferin, could announce that prior to
Euro 2020 that the competition could act as a ‘bridge between nations’ and come closer to
the fans (UEFA, 2016b).
The ‘bridge between nations’ analogy was also visible in the event’s branding and
official logos, where European bridges bridged together cultural landmarks and stadiums
in the respective host cities, perhaps in an attempt to create common European identi-
fications and symbols as discussed by King (2004) in relation to UEFA.4 In late 2017,
however, it was confirmed that 13 cities were reduced to 12 when Brussels lost its hosting
rights because the city’s proposed stadium would not be completed in time (Ludvigsen,
2019).5
Essentially, it can be argued that the discourses leading up to Euro 2020 emphasized
inclusivity and continent-wide participation. This is amplified by the event promotion and
slogans. One may also observe references to financial strains of mega-events that have
been already been contextualized. This connects with Parent and Chappelet (2015: 11)
who argued that one of the reasons for Euro 2020’s format was ‘the difficulty of finding
countries with about 12 stadiums capable of hosting a competition of this size, which
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involve 24 teams’. Therefore, there was a lack of interested single hosts and pre-
dominantly, the selected Euro 2020 stadia were pre-existing and used in domestic club
football (Ludvigsen, 2019). Indeed, the lack of interest may be located in the realm of
SMEs where public opposition to the public expenditures SMEs require can be identified
(Giulianotti et al., 2015; Talbot, 2021). This also came to the fore in one of my interviews
where one stakeholder commented that: ‘when they started the bidding process the only
bidder they had was Turkey’ (Stakeholder 8).
Therefore, in an attempt to make better sociological sense of Euro 2020 and under what
conditions it became a reality, it is appropriate to argue that the decision to award Euro
2020 to 13 (later, 12) host countries can be viewed as relating to a set of inter-
connected internal and external factors. Internal factors then include the expansion
from 16 to 24 qualified teams, the desire of bringing the tournament ‘closer’ to
European fans and the tournament’s 60th anniversary. Meanwhile, the external factors
include the lack of interested hosts (Parent and Chappelet, 2015), which again may be
seen in context of broader scepticism towards hosting rights bidding in the 21st
century (Talbot, 2021).
Limiting risks and negative legacies
Mega-events and their associated construction projects, including costly infrastructures,
stadiums or monuments have been heavily criticized by politicians, residents and aca-
demics for turning into what is oft-referred to as ‘white elephants’ (Preuss, 2007). The
idea of ‘white elephants’ is commonly encapsulated by post-event reports with images of
declining or decaying event venues (The Guardian, 2017). According to Horne (2007:
91), ‘one of the persistent public concerns is whether monuments can turn into “white
elephants”’ and, essentially, cost more than they are worth. This is, of course, highly
incompatible with promises of an array of positive legacies when an event’s days are
over. Mega-events are associated with enormous costs and, occasionally, financial
debts – as the 1976 Montreal Olympics serves a real reminder of (Broudehoux, 2007).
Since the organizational demands and costs have merely increased in recent years,
there has been some reluctance and even resistance towards bidding for or hosting
mega-events that are deemed too costly (Talbot, 2021; Boykoff, 2020). Recently, this
has made some nations opt out of the bidding stage for SMEs (Paulsson and Alm,
2020).6
Against this background, stakeholders considered Euro 2020’s decentralized format to
reduce the potential negative legacies for host cities, mainly because the tournament’s
games predominantly was assigned to pre-existing venues. From the interviews, the
avoidance of ‘white elephants’ was indeed touched upon, as exemplified below:
JL: And also, it’s the first time they’re doing this, this way, so I guess there’s some excitement
around that?
Stakeholder 7: First, and probably the last.
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JL: Maybe. But I think even in… FIFA decided to put the 2026 World Cup in Canada,
Mexico and USA. So, it’s not 12 countries, but a big area?
Stakeholder 7: […] One way, you know with the [Euro] 2020, from the Olympic side, you
don’t want any white elephants and build stadiums that are not being used or expensive
infrastructure. But at the same time the logistical challenges are not ideal.
Here, one may observe that the stakeholder frames the lack of extensive infra-
structural and stadium projects at Euro 2020 as a feature that prevents ‘white
elephants’ from emerging post-event. The response also illuminates questions
around the format and if it will be resorted to again. Stakeholder 7 confidently
expressed that it probably would be the last time the Euros would take up a 12-
country format, whereas the logistical challenges, discussed below, also are dis-
tinctively referred to.
Stadium constructions for mega-events can be costly and controversial in an event’s
build-up (Millward, 2017). Post-event, venues may not be accessible for the wider local
public (Horne and Manzenreiter 2006: 75) or sufficiently maintained. As (Horne and
Manzenreiter, 2004: 190) submitted following Japan’s hosting of the 2002 World Cup
(with South Korea), ‘[a] full account of hosting the half World Cup must include the
US$ 4.6 billion investment Japan spent on ten state-of-art stadia’ in addition to the
‘the huge costs of maintaining the prestigious yet mainly useless “white elephants”’
with capacity exceeding the demand in the Japanese football league. As some in-
terviewees touched upon, such prospects were largely believed to be avoided by Euro
2020’s hosting format because the assigned stadiums generally were actively utilized
in the remainder of the sporting calendar in domestic league football, for other
sporting events or concerts. As the following example illustrates, the economic risks
connected to construction projects could potentially be mitigated by Euro 2020’s
format (one city per country) and the decision to predominantly stage games at pre-
existing venues:
Stakeholder 3: You can understand the reason why they have done the Euro 2020 as they
have. Portugal [Euro 2004] was a fantastic tournament if you were a visiting fan, but an
economic disaster if you were Portuguese. Because they spent so much money on in-
frastructure for stadiums that were going to get …
JL: Not be much use after the event’s days are over?
Stakeholder 3: Even during the event […] One of the games had barely five figures crowd,
Czech Republic – Latvia. And I think UEFA had a guilt trip about that.
The excerpt also scratches the surface of ‘white elephants’ perceived to cost more than
they are worth (see Horne, 2007). That is not to say stadium upgrades would be
completely absent in Euro 2020’s case, even when pre-existing stadia were assigned
matches (Ludvigsen, 2019). For example, Wembley’s floodlights reportedly required a £2
10 Journal of Consumer Culture 0(0)
million upgrade prior to Euro 2020 (Sky Sports, 2018). Though, in comparison to the
cost of a brand-new stadium, such fees appear relatively modest. Clearly, Euro 2020’s
format was considered by some stakeholders as one solution to relevant problems of
venue maintenance and financial costs which have occurred after earlier mega-
events.
Furthermore, the perceived, less intensive organizational strains of mega-event hosting
on local economies and communities were highlighted as one potential advantage offered
by Euro 2020’s format. According to a number of interviewees, this would open up for
host countries that otherwise would be disinterested in bidding for hosting rights as
a single host, as exemplified below:
I think that the multi-host system has its advantages because it will open up the possibility of
smaller countries hosting the tournaments. Particularly bearing in mind the move to have 24
teams. That rules out some countries that did, have hosted tournaments in the past. We have
had multi-championships before. Holland and Belgium, Austria and Switzerland, Poland and
Ukraine. I think that’s a better way to go, than to do it all the way across the continent.
Because if you want to have that festive atmosphere, then you need to have a focal point. You
need a sense that this is something going on for all the teams (Stakeholder 3).
Likewise, the potentially reduced organizational demands were referred to by another
interviewee:
It is an interesting one with 2020 isn’t it? Because it’s a sort of unusual and novel format so in
many ways. I think it’ll be a lot easier, because the strain will be a lot less. You can plan a lot
more specifically and have a lot of more forewarning, and you wouldn’t have to stretch
resources as perhaps you would if it was a national event where there were eight games taking
place (Stakeholder 2).
In that sense, stakeholders perceived the format of Euro 2020 to facilitate for inclusivity
by yielding an opportunity for nations that otherwise may have been deterred from acting
as a sole bidder of an event of the Euros’ size. Although this was emphasized, there were
some hesitations related to the extraordinary large geographical area of Euro 2020,
however. Visibly, Stakeholder 3 preferred a two-host format, whilst Euro 2020 decen-
tralized nature, accordingly, meant the lack of a ‘focal point’. In sum, the stakeholder
accounts make it possible to argue that Euro 2020’s format was considered to be one that
facilitated for less risk of leaving behind negative legacies (cf. Horne, 2007; Preuss, 2007)
and, thereby, could be an alternative for hosts aware of the ‘mega-event syndrome’
(Müller, 2015a). Notwithstanding, all this also raises questions related to environmental
sustainability. UEFA (2019) pledged towards an environmentally conscious Euro 2020.
However, the extent to which this remains compatible with the idea of fans travelling
across four time zones remains open for questioning. Tentatively, it may be suggested that
the use of pre-existing venues in different countries provides both a potential solution (to
‘white elephants’) and a new challenge due to excessive (air-)travelling by teams, their
entourages and event consumers.
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Between heightened fan costs and ‘logistical nightmares’
Already, Euro 2020’s format has been subject to criticism. For example, Belgian mid-
fielder, Kevin De Bruyne, expressed that: ‘It’s a shame. For me, this feels like a fake
competition. Football has become more and more a business’ (quoted in The Guardian,
2019). Meanwhile, Greg Clarke, then-chairman of the English FA, was sceptical of the
event format’s implications and how this could translate into both high costs and
logistical complexities for the event’s consumers: the fans (Ludvigsen, 2019). He
stated that: ‘It’s like trying to book a low-cost airline in the summer when the school
holidays are on’ and that ‘the free market will set the prices between those cities.
Demands and prices are high and I’m not sure what Uefa can do about it’ (quoted in
BBC, 2016).
This could be placed in context of football’s hyper-commodification and the trans-
formation of the sport’s political economy which has led to an expansion of continental
and global competitions and increased the ‘aestheticization of consumer culture’ in
football (Giulianotti, 2002: 29). In terms of the Euros, this has meant increased spon-
sorship opportunities (Horne, 2010), expansion to a 24-team competition and new spaces,
such as fan zones. At the same time, the cited ‘demands’must be seen as related to the idea
of mega-event attendance often being considered a carnivalesque expression (Giulianotti,
1995) and liminal experience that football fans will be highly committed to participate in,
although it is associated with financial costs for transport, accommodation, tickets and
living costs (ibid.). Furthermore, it provides opportunities for blending event attendance
with tourism and sightseeing (Dart, 2009). Importantly, it is not denied here that many
fans could likely to be provided with an opportunity to participate in SME consumption
through Euro 2020’s format. However, mega-events’ socio-cultural position as a tourist
destination was, as stakeholders remarked, seriously complicated by Euro 2020’s format.
Dominant themes from the interviews were the high costs for fans, logistical diffi-
culties – or, ‘a logistical nightmare’ (Stakeholder 9) – and a feeling of a de-centralized
competition. The latter was already touched upon in the comment referring to the absence
of a ‘focal point’, but is also highlighted below, where the stakeholder was asked about the
format:
Stakeholder 9: At a working capacity I like it. I like the interaction and comparisons, and it
helps me do my job. It allows me to see what nations do well and do not, and they can learn
from one another and that’s the good thing about meeting them two or three times advance to
the tournament. So, I find that really beneficial. As a fan, not so much, because there’s
uncertainty. You don’t know where you’re playing. Financially, it’s not great. Because you’re
left booking things last minute, and that’s even as an England fan, we only play 2 games away
from Wembley.
JL: Yeah?
Stakeholder 9: Additionally, you don’t get the vibe that you’re hosting the European
Championships.
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Here, Stakeholder 9’s perceptions are mixed. On a professional level, the style allowed for
transnational lesson-drawing and greater insight into the workings of football governance,
football policing and event organization on a European scale. Yet, the same stakeholder’s
reflections from a fan perspective were less favourable of the format. Particularly because
of the extreme levels of uncertainty involved in trying to plan an itinerary in advance,
which is associated with lower costs of holidaymaking.
Likewise, the likely, high costs imposed on travelling fans were expanded on in more
length in another interview:
Stakeholder 3: One of the things, it is a lot of factors. How much holiday people have […] I
think it’s a great deal of uncertainty here, about how many people that are going on short
notice, to travel hundreds, if not thousands of miles across Europe to go the last 16 and the
final matches.
JL: It will be expensive for the everyday fan, I guess?
Stakeholder 3: Something, one other thing with tournaments, as somebody who goes to them
to see one team but is delighted to see other matches, is that it is in fact harder to get a ticket
for group games, than it is for the final even. Because people run out of holidays, fans book
time off work, for when they know their team is playing, and then work out if they can get to
the final […] Not everyone can have one month off work.
JL: I guess that some people will have a ticket for, let’s say a quarter final, and then their team
don’t go to the quarter final, and sell them to other fans sometimes, as well?
Stakeholder 3: That’s something that’s going to break down here, because you’re going to be
in the wrong country for that quarter final
Naturally, every football mega-event involving knock-out stages will have an inherent
degree of uncertainty in the fixture list that causes challenges for travelling fans. Such
difficulties are not uncommonly reflected on in football fans’ travelogues that through
popular literary form describe the fan experiences from international tournaments (Dart,
2009). Yet, as the above dialogue reveals, these uncertainties related to fixture lists were
seen as amplified because of the large geographical distances between host cities (for
a figure, see Parnell et al., 2020: 3) and the fact that the mega-event’s original dates
coincided with an inherently busy summer holiday season.
This, again, was expected to translate into high costs for football fans and a scenario
where fans would secure tickets for a game, but find out that their team would play
elsewhere than envisaged, or not play at all after being eliminated. As noted, this could
result in situations where fans ‘don’t know where [they are] going in the Round of 16
and Quarter Final until three days’ notice’ (Stakeholder 9). This was believed to be
substantial logistical obstacle and coming at large financial costs for travelling fans.
This also emerged as a paradox considering the idea that Euro 2020’s format would
bring the tournament closer to the fans. Additionally, it was perceived to place limits on
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the planned policing and security operations related to the matches and tournament as
a whole. Thus, logistically, Euro 2020 provided both organizers and fans with a set of
difficulties that made the planning and indeed pre-booking stage increasingly
complicated.
Furthermore, the feeling of hosting a mega-event of the Euros size was accordingly
impacted. Inherent to mega-events is the celebration of collective identities and show-
casing of national cultures (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Roche, 2000). As Stakeholder
9 commented, Euro 2020 created a different ‘vibe’ because of its decentralized format and
continued by commenting that ‘if there was a European Championship to be held in the
UK across 10 different cities, I think that feeling of having a European Championship and
buying into it would be massive nationwide’ (Stakeholder 9). This connects with the idea
of mega-event ‘feel-good effects’, which is the ‘sense of communal wellbeing that
appears to be provoked under certain circumstances’ like SMEs (Cornelissen and
Maennig, 2010: 97). Similarly, Stakeholder 8 commented that the organization they
are associated with, instead of approaching Euro 2020 as a ‘typical’ European Cham-
pionship, approached it as single games: ‘what we’re doing is we’re treating it not so
much like a tournament, but more like two games like the [European] qualifier’, si-
multaneously ‘the only extra dimension is that we don’t know where those games are
going to be’. The same stakeholder also believed that Euro 2020 represented a ‘one-off’:
‘I’m not a fan of this set up […] They [UEFA] made clear all the way through that it would
be once, and once only like this’ (Stakeholder 8). In this sense, the presented evidence
here underpins and make it arguable that Euro 2020’s format, as forecasted (Ludvigsen,
2019; BBC, 2016), was seen as translating a set of uncertainties emanating from unusual
logistical hurdles for organizers, travelling fans and stakeholders. Interestingly, against
the background of an event promotion focused on European-wide inclusion of fans and
the creation of an ‘experience [that] feels inclusive and can unite fans’ (UEFA, n.d., Sector
2: 3), the interviewed stakeholders perceived the event format to concurrently amplify
costs for travelling fans whereas its spatially diffuse nature was considered to possibly
impede the desired ‘feel-good effect’ which consumers of mega-events seek towards
(Cornelissen and Maennig, 2010).
Conclusions
As argued, SMEs can be constructively utilized by social researchers to understand wider
social issues and changes (Gilchrist et al., 2015; Roche, 2000). As Giulianotti et al. (2015:
113) remind us, ‘the staging of these expanding, hugely expensive events is a major public
issue for host societies and is therefore a significant subject of research inquiry’. This
study advances the sociological understanding of Euro 2020 which –when it takes place –
is likely to be a landmark in global sports and the consumption of football. The European
Championship, often considered the third largest SME worldwide and the ‘second largest
football spectacle in the world’ (Horne, 2010: 857), is an important institution in Eu-
ropean societies and for global audiences and consumer cultures, perhaps best illustrated
by an expected inflow of 2.5 million visitors for Euro 2020 pre-COVID-19 (The
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Independent, 2020). This article examines the conditions under which Euro 2020’s style
became a reality and situates the 12-country hosting format in a broader socio-political
context. It also explores the perceived impacts of this hosting style on the mega-event’s
transnational consumption. Subsequently, this assists our understanding of Euro 2020’s
exceptionality both sociologically and historically.
The article advances three key arguments. First, it is apparent that the decision to award
Euro 2020 to 12 countries was largely framed as a move allowing the tournament to come
closer to the fans geographically and emotionally, so fans could partake in the wider
consumption of the mega-event. Simultaneously, this decision may be explained by a set
of internal and external factors – such as a growing disinterest in hosting rights – which
again could be seen as inter-linked to the professionalization and commercialization
processes impacting elite sports, which have impacted the financial and organizational
demands attached to mega-event hosting. My findings shed light on the socio-political
dynamics behind Euro 2020. Second, it is argued that the fact that this SME’s fixtures
predominantly was assigned to pre-existing venues/stadiums was regarded as positive by
stakeholders as long as this was synonymous with more modest financial commitments
and investments than what has been the case at previous mega-events. Hence, the format
was viewed as one way of reducing the risk of negative legacies that may cause public
concerns in the mega-event context (Horne, 2007; Preuss, 2007). Third, the geographical
distance between host countries would give rise to novel logistical challenges and was
regarded as associated with increased costs for the main events consumers, namely the
fans. This was paradoxical when juxtaposed with the idea of Euro 2020 being brought to
the fans. The findings therefore attach empirical nuances to pre-existing concerns
(Ludvigsen, 2019).
Despite being anchored in a single case study – as a natural limitation to this study – the
article still makes a number of meaningful, original and timely scholarly contributions.
Euro 2020 and, more broadly, the European Championships have been assigned limited
research compared to the Olympics and the World Cup, and so, this article complements
our understanding of the socio-historical roots of this ‘pan-European’ festival that,
following COVID-19, was postponed to 2021. In Euro 2020’s special context, the study
extends existing debates and our knowledge on mega-event housing and related,
emerging issues and dynamics in the 21st century. Importantly, mega-event hosting is
characterized by public concerns and opposition (Giulianotti et al., 2015; Talbot, 2021)
and a constant presence in the global media (Roche, 2000). Although this article employs
a sporting-related exemplar, its findings can still speak to current debates around con-
temporary commercial projects, tourism and what Giulianotti et al. (2015) call ‘festival
capitalism’ in the broader social sphere.
Moreover, if Euro 2020 comes to symbolize a watershed moment in the world of
SMEs, indicating that such geographically dispersed events or sports festivals are be-
coming increasingly resorted to, then my findings can potentially assist not only the social
study of events, but policy-makers, planners and future organizers. As a final note, it
remains important that researches continue to study Euro 2020 and its impacts, especially
since COVID-19 has generated a set of new research questions speaking to event tourism,
broadcasting, consumption, particularly due to travelling restrictions and the pandemic’s
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impact on live spectator sports. However, ‘continent-wide spectacles’ (Ludvigsen, 2019)
such as Euro 2020 also raise important research questions speaking to environmental
sustainability and European integration and identity with, for example, the semi-finals and
final being staged in London in the UK’s first post-Brexit mega-event. These questions,
too, are central to future research.
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Notes
1. Notwithstanding, in late April 2021, Dublin lost their Euro 2020 games since the city could not
guarantee the presence of fans. Because this happened after the study’s completion, I will still
make references to the 12-country hosting format.
2. See: https://www.uefa.com/uefaeuro-2020/news/025e-0fac6d3ee9e4-85b1a76389ea-1000–euro-
venues-confirmed/.
3. Three interviews were conducted in-person, three via Skype and three via email.
4. See: http://www.thefa.com/news/2016/sep/21/uefa-euro-2020-logo-launch-21092016
5. See: https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/42270759
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